The Watergate "Smoking-Gun" Conversation

from Stanley I. Kutler (ed.) Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), pp. 67-69

In three meetings on June 23, Nixon and Haldeman conduct what comes to be known as the “smoking-gun" conversation. They conspire to call in CIA Director Richard Helms and his deputy, General Vernon Walters (a longtime associate of the President's), and direct them to tell FBI Acting Director Pat Gray that the Bureau's investigation impinged on CIA operations. Haldeman has some concern: “But we're relying on more and more people all the time.” Haldeman also speaks of pressure on CREEP aides to produce more "information." The tape

was made public on August 5, 1974—too late for consideration by the House Impeachment Inquiry, but soon enough to allow most House Republicans to abandon the President and hasten his resignation.

JUNE 23, 1972; THE PRESIDENT AND HALDEMAN, 10:04-11:39 A.M., OVAL OFFICE

HALDEMAN: OK, that's fine. Now, on the investigation, you know, the Democratic break-in thing, we're back to the . .. problem area because the FBI is not under control, because [Acting FBI director, L. Patrick] Gray doesn't exactly know how to control them, and. . . their investigation is now leading into some productive areas, because they've been able to trace

money, not through the money itself, but through the bank. . . . [A]nd it goes in Some directions we don’t want it to go. . . .[T]here have been some things, like an informant came in off the street to the FBI in Miami, who as a photographer, or has a friend who is a photographer who developed some films through this guy [Watergate burglar Bernard] Barker, and the films

had pictures of Democratic National Committee letterhead[s] . . . . Mitchell came up with yesterday, and [Counsel to the President] John Dean analyzed very carefully last night and concludes—concurs—now with Mitchell’s recommendation that the only way to solve this . . . is for us to have [Deputy CIA Director Vernon] Walters call Pat Gray and just say, "Stay the hell out of this. ..this is ah, business here we don't want you to go any further on it." That's not an unusual development. . . .

PRESIDENT NIXON: What about Pat Gray; you mean he doesn't want to?

HALDEMAN: Pat does want to. He doesn't know how to, and he doesn't have, he doesn’t have any basis for doing it. Given this, he will then have the basis. He’ll call Mark Felt in, and the two of them . . . and Mark Felt wants to cooperate because—

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: —he's ambitious.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: He'll call him in and say, "We've got the signal from across the river to, to put the hold on this.” And that

will fit rather well because the FBI agents who are working the case, at this point, feel that's what it is. This is CIA.

PRESIDENT NIXON: But they've traced the money to ‘em.

HALDEMAN: Well they have, they've traced to a name, but they haven't gotten to the guy yet.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Would it be somebody here?

HALDEMAN: Ken Dahlberg [who worked for prominent Nixon contributor Dwayne Andreas].

PRESIDENT NIXON: Who the hell is Ken Dahlberg?

HALDEMAN: He's, he gave $25,000 in Minnesota and the check went directly in to this, to this guy, Barker.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Maybe he's a . . . bum. He didn't get this from the committee though, from [Finance Chairman of CREEP, Maurice] Stans?

HALDEMAN: Yeah. It is. It is. It's directly traceable and there's some more through some Texas people in—that went to the Mexican bank which they can also trace to the Mexican bank. . . . They'll get their names today. . . .

PRESIDENT NIXON: I'm just thinking if they don't cooperate, what do they say? They, they, they were approached by the Cubans? That's what Dahlberg has to say, the Texans too. Is that the idea?

HALDEMAN: Well, if they will. But then we're relying on more and more people all the time. That's the problem. And they'll stop if we could, if we take this other step.

PRESIDENT NIXON: All right. Fine.

HALDEMAN: And, and they seem to feel the thing to do is get them to stop.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Right, fine.

HALDEMAN: They say the only way to do that is from White House instructions. And it's got to be to Helms and what's his name? [Deputy CIA Director General Vernon] Walters?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Walters.

HALDEMAN: And the proposal would be that [Counsel to the President, John] Ehrlichman and I call him.

PRESIDENT NIXON: All right, fine. . . . How do you call him in, I mean you just —well, we protected [CIA director Richard] Helms from one hell of a lot of things.

HALDEMAN: That's what Ehrlichman says.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Of course, this . . . [Watergate burglar, E. Howard] Hunt, . . . that will uncover a lot of, a lot of—you open that scab there's a hell of a lot of things in it that we just feel that this would be very detrimental to have this thing go any further. This involves these Cubans, Hunt, and a lot of hanky-panky that we have nothing to do with ourselves. What the

hell, did Mitchell know about this thing to any much of a degree?

HALDEMAN: I think so. I don't think he knew the details, but I think he knew.

PRESIDENT NIXON: He didn't know how it was going to be handled though, with Dahlberg and the Texans and so forth? Well, who was the asshole that did? Is it [Watergate planner, G. Gordon] Liddy? Is that the fellow? He must be a little nuts.

HALDEMAN: He is.

PRESIDENT NIXON: I mean he just isn't well-screwed-on is he? Isn't that the problem?

HALDEMAN: No, but he was under pressure, apparently, to get more information, and as he got more pressure, he pushed the people harder to move harder on.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Pressure from [Attorney General and CREEP Chairman, John] Mitchell?

HALDEMAN: Apparently. . . .

PRESIDENT NIXON: All right, fine, I understand it all. We won't second-guess Mitchell and the rest. Thank God it wasn't Colson.

HALDEMAN: The FBI interviewed [Presidential aide, Charles]Colson yesterday. They determined that would be a good thing to do. . . . An interrogation, which he did, and that, the FBI guys working the case had concluded that there are one or two possibilities: one, that this was a White House [operation], they don’t think that there is anything at the Election Committee

— they think it was either a White House operation and they had some obscure reasons for it. ...Or it was a—

PRESIDENT NIXON: Cuban thing —

HALDEMAN: — Cubans and the CIA. And after their interrogation of—

PRESIDENT NIXON: Colson.

HALDEMAN: — Colson, yesterday, they concluded it was not the White House, but are now convinced it's the CIA thing, so the CIA turnoff would —

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, not sure of their analysis, I’m not going to get that involved. . . . HALDEMAN: No, sir. We don't want you to.

PRESIDENT NIXON: You call them in. Good. Good deal. Play it tough. That's the way they play it and that's the way we are going to play it.

HALDEMAN: O.K. We’ll do it.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Yeah, when I saw that news summary item, I of course knew it bunch of crap, but I thought, that, well it's good to have them off on this wild hare thing because when [the Democrats] start bugging us, which they have, we’ll know our little boys will not know how to handle it. I hope they will though.

HALDEMAN: Good, you never know. Maybe, you think about it. . . .

PRESIDENT NIXON: When you get in these people . . . say: "Look, the problem is that this will open the whole, the whole Bay of Pigs thing, and the President just feels that” – without going into the details — don’t, don't lie to them to the extent to say there is no involvement, but just say this is sort of a comedy of errors, bizarre, without getting into it. "The President's belief is that this is going to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing up again. And because these people are plugging for, for keeps, and that they should call the FBI in and say that we wish for the country, don't go any further into this case,” period.. . .