For April 16
The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done
by Peter Edelman Atlantic Monthly (March 1997)
(Edelman
was a Clinton appointee who resigned in protest after the welfare bill was
passed. Why does he argue that the
welfare bill fulfill the “Reagan Revolution”? What are the specific provisions
of the welfare reform? How does the history of the War on Poverty relate to
this bill?
I
hate welfare. To be more precise, I hate the welfare system we had until
last August, when Bill Clinton signed a
historic bill ending "welfare as
we know it." It was a system that contributed to chronic dependency
among large numbers of people who would be the first to say they would rather
have a job than collect a welfare check every month -- and its benefits were
never enough to lift people out of poverty. In April of 1967 I helped Robert Kennedy with a speech in which he
called the welfare system bankrupt and said it was hated universally, by payers
and recipients alike. Criticism of welfare for not helping people to become
self-supporting is nothing
new.
But the bill that President Clinton
signed is not welfare reform. It does
not promote work effectively, and it will hurt millions of poor children by the
time it is fully implemented. What's more, it bars hundreds of thousands of
legal immigrants -- including many who
have worked in the United States for decades and paid a considerable amount in
Social Security and income taxes -- from receiving disability and old-age
assistance and food stamps, and reduces food-stamp assistance for millions
of children in working families.
Governor Clinton campaigned in 1992 on
the promise to "end welfare as we know it" and the companion phrase
"Two years and you're off." He knew very well that a major piece of
welfare-reform legislation, the Family Support Act, had already been passed, in
1988. As governor of Arkansas he had been deeply involved in the enactment of
that law, which was based on extensive state experimentation with new
welfare-to-work initiatives in the
1980s, especially GAIN in California. The 1988 law represented a major
bipartisan compromise. The Democrats had given in on work requirements in
return for Republican concessions on significant federal funding for job
training, placement activities, and transitional child care and health
coverage.
The Family Support Act had not been
fully implemented, partly because not enough time had passed and partly because
in the recession of the Bush years the states had been unable to provide the
matching funds necessary to draw down their full share of job-related federal
money. Candidate Clinton ought responsibly to have said that the Family Support
Act was a major piece of legislation that needed more time to be fully
implemented before anyone could say whether it was a success or a failure.
Instead Clinton promised to end welfare
as we know it and to institute what sounded like a two-year time limit. This
was bumper-sticker politics -- oversimplification to win votes. Polls during the campaign showed that
it was very popular, and a salient item in garnering votes. Clinton's slogans
were also cleverly ambiguous. On the one
hand, as President, Clinton could
take a relatively liberal path that was nonetheless consistent with his
campaign rhetoric. In 1994 he proposed legislation that required everyone to be
working by the time he or she had been
on the rolls for two years. But it also said, more or less in the fine print,
that people who played by the rules and couldn't find work could continue to get benefits within the same
federal-state framework that had existed since 1935. The President didn't say
so, but he was building -- quite
incrementally and on the whole responsibly -- on the framework of the
Family Support Act. On the other hand, candidate Clinton had let his listeners
infer that he intended radical reform with real fall-off-the-cliff time limits.
He never said so explicitly, though, so his liberal flank had nothing definitive
to criticize. President Clinton's actual 1994 proposal was based on a
responsible interpretation of what candidate Clinton had said.
Candidate Clinton, however, had let a
powerful genie out of the bottle. During his first two years it mattered only
insofar as his rhetoric promised far
more than his legislative proposal actually offered. When the Republicans
gained control of Congress in 1994, the bumper-sticker rhetoric began to matter. So you want time limits? the
Republicans said in 1995.
Good idea. We'll give you some serious time limits. We now propose an absolute lifetime limit of five
years, cumulatively, that a family can
be on welfare. End welfare as we know it?
You bet. From now on we will have block grants. And what does that mean?
First, that there will be no federal definition of who is eligible and therefore no guarantee of assistance to
anyone; each state can decide whom to exclude in any way it wants, as long as
it doesn't violate the Constitution (not much of a limitation when one reads
the Supreme Court decisions on this subject). And second, that each state will
get a fixed sum of federal money each year, even if a recession or a local
calamity causes a state to run out of federal funds before the end of the year.
This was a truly radical proposal. For sixty years Aid to
Families with Dependent Children had been premised on the idea of entitlement.
"Entitlement" has become a dirty word, but it is actually a term of
art. It meant two things in the AFDC
program: a federally defined guarantee of assistance to families with
children who met the statutory definition of need and complied with the other
conditions of the law; and a federal
guarantee to the states of a matching share of the money needed to help
everyone in the state who qualified for help. (AFDC was never a guarantor of
income at any particular level. States
chose their own benefit levels, and no state's AFDC benefits, even when coupled
with food stamps, currently lift families out of poverty.) The block grants
will end the entitlement in both respects, and in addition the time limits say
that federally supported help will end even if a family has done everything
that was asked of it and even if it is still needy. . . .
T HIS was the major milestone in the
political race to the bottom. The
President had said he was willing to sign legislation that would end a
sixty-year commitment to provide assistance to all needy families with children
who met the federal eligibility
requirements. In the floor debate Senator Edward Kennedy, who voted against the
bill, described it as "legislative
child abuse….
The game was over. Now no one could ever
say again with any credibility that the President is an old liberal….
Why is the new law so bad? To begin
with, it turned out that after all the noise and heat over the past two years
about balancing the budget, the only deep, multi-year budget cuts actually
enacted were those in this bill, affecting low-income people.
The magnitude of the impact is
stunning. Its dimensions were estimated by the Urban Institute, using the same
model that produced the Department of Health and Human Services study a year
earlier. To ensure credibility for the study, its authors made optimistic assumptions: two thirds of
long-term recipients would find jobs, and all states would maintain their
current levels of financial support for the benefit structure. Nonetheless, the
study showed, the bill would move 2.6 million people, including 1.1 million children, into poverty. It
also predicted some powerful effects not contained in the previous year's analysis, which had been constrained in what
it could cover because it had been sponsored by the Administration. The new
study showed that a total of 11 million families -- 10 percent of all American
families -- would lose income under the bill. This included more than eight million families with children, many
of them working families affected by
the food-stamp cuts, which would lose an average of about $1,300 per family.
Many working families with income a little above what we call the poverty line
(right now $12,158 for a family of three) would lose income without being made
officially poor, and many families already poor would be made poorer.
The view expressed by the White House
and by Hill Democrats, who wanted to put their votes for the bill in the best
light, was that the parts of the bill affecting immigrants and food stamps were
awful (and would be re-addressed in the future) but that the welfare-reform
part of the bill was basically all right. The immigrant and food-stamp parts of
the bill are awful, but so is the welfare part.
The immigrant provisions are strong
stuff. Most legal immigrants currently in the country and nearly all future
legal immigrants are to be denied Supplemental Security Income and food stamps.
States have the option of denying them Medicaid and welfare as well. New immigrants will be excluded from most
federal means-tested programs, including Medicaid, for the first five years
they are in the country. All of this will save about $22 billion over the next
six years -- about 40 percent of the savings in the bill. The SSI cuts are the
worst. Almost 800,000 legal immigrants
receive SSI, and most of these will be cut off. Many elderly and disabled
noncitizens who have been in the United States for a long time and lack the
mental capacity to do what is necessary to become citizens will be thrown out
of their homes or out of nursing homes or other group residential settings that
are no longer reimbursed for their care.
The food-stamp cuts are very
troubling too. Exclusive of the food-stamp cuts for immigrants, they involve
savings of about $24 billion. Almost
half of that is in across-the-board cuts in the way benefits are calculated.
About two thirds of the benefit reductions will be borne by families with
children, many of them working families (thus reflecting a policy outcome
wildly inconsistent with the stated purposes of the overall bill).
Perhaps the most troubling cut is the
one limiting food stamps to three
months out of every three years for unemployed adults under age fifty who are
not raising children.. .. One of the great strengths of food stamps until now
has been that it was the one major program for the poor in which help was based
only on need, with no reference to family status or age. It was the safety net
under the safety net. That principle of pure need-based eligibility has now
been breached.
Neither the cuts for immigrants nor
the food-stamp cuts have anything to do with welfare reform. Many of them are
just mean, with no good policy justification. The bill also contains other
budget and benefit reductions unrelated to welfare. The definition of SSI
eligibility for disabled children has been narrowed, which will result in
removal from the rolls of 100,000 to 200,000 of the 965,000 children who
currently receive SSI. Although there was broad agreement that some tightening
in eligibility was warranted, the changes actually made will result in the loss
of coverage for some children who if they were adults would be considered
disabled. Particularly affected are children with multiple impairments no one
of which is severe enough to meet the new, more stringent criteria.
Child-nutrition programs have also been cut, by nearly $3
billion over six years, affecting meals for children in family day care and in
the summer food program. . .
So this is hardly just a welfare
bill. In fact, most of its budget reductions come in programs for the poor
other than welfare, and many of them affect working families. Many of them are
just cuts, not reform. (The bill also contains an elaborate reform of federal child-support laws, which had
broad bipartisan support and could easily have been enacted as separate
legislation.)
This brings us to welfare itself.
Basically, the block grants mean that the states can now do almost
anything they want -- even provide no
cash benefits at all. . .States may contract out any or all of what they do to
charitable, religious, or private organizations . ..
The change in the structure is
total. Previously there was a national definition of eligibility. With some
limitations regarding two-parent families, any needy family with children could
get help. There were rules about participation in work and training, but
anybody who played by the rules could continue to get assistance. If people
were thrown off the rolls without justification, they could get a hearing to
set things right, and could go to court if necessary. The system will no longer
work that way.
The other major structural change is
that federal money is now capped. The block grants total $16.4 billion annually
for the country, with no new funding for jobs and training and placement
efforts, which are in fact very expensive activities to carry out. For the
first couple of years most of the states will get a little more money than they
have been getting, because the formula gives them what they were spending a
couple of years ago, and welfare rolls
have actually decreased somewhat almost
Many governors are currently crowing
about this "windfall" of new
federal money. But what they are not telling their voters is that the federal
funding will stay the same for the next six years, with no adjustment for
inflation or population growth, so by 2002 states will have considerably less
federal money to spend than they would have had under AFDC. The states will
soon have to choose between benefits and job-related activities, with the very
real possibility that they will run out of federal money before the end of a
given year. A small contingency fund exists for recessions, and an even smaller
fund to compensate for disproportionate population increases, but it is easy to
foresee a time when states will have to either tell applicants to wait for the
next fiscal year or spend their own money to keep benefits flowing.
The bill closes its eyes to all
the facts and complexities of the real world and essentially says to
recipients, Find a job. That has a nice bumper-sticker ring to it. But as a
one-size-fits-all recipe it is totally unrealistic.
Total cutoffs of help will be felt
right away only by immigrants and disabled children -- not insignificant
exceptions. The big hit, which could be very big, will come when the time
limits go into effect -- in five years, or less if the state so chooses -- or
when a recession hits. State treasuries are relatively flush at the moment,
with the nation in the midst of a modest boom period. When the time limits first take effect, a large group of people
in each state will fall into the abyss all at once. Otherwise the effects will
be fairly gradual. Calcutta will not break out instantly on American streets.
To the extent that there are any
constraints on the states in the new law, they are negative. The two largest --
and they are very large -- are the time limit and the work-participation requirements.
There is a cumulative lifetime limit of
five years on benefits paid for with federal money, and states are free to
impose shorter time limits if they like. One exception is permitted, to be
applied at the state's discretion: as much as 20 percent of the caseload at any
particular time may be people who have already received assistance for five
years. This sounds promising until one understands that about half the current
caseload is composed of people who have been on the rolls longer than five
years. A recent study sponsored by the Kaiser Foundation found that 30 percent
of the caseload is composed of women who are caring for disabled children or
are disabled themselves. The
time limits will be especially tough in states that have large areas in chronic
recession -- for example, the coal-mining areas of Appalachia. And they will be
even tougher when the country as a whole sinks into recession. It will make no
difference if a recipient has played by all the rules and sought work
faithfully, as required. When the limit is reached and the state is unable or
unwilling to grant an exception, welfare will be over for that family forever.
Under the work-participation
requirements, 25 percent of the caseload must be working or in training this
year, and 50 percent by 2002. For two-parent families 75 percent of the
caseload must be working or in training, and the number goes up to 90 percent
in two years. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the bill falls $12
billion short of providing enough funding over the next six years for the
states to meet the work requirements. Even the highly advertised increased
child-care funding falls more than $1 billion short of providing enough funding
for all who would have to work in order for the work requirements to be
satisfied. States that fail to meet the work requirements lose increasing
percentages of their block grants.
The states are given a rather
Machiavellian out. The law in effect assumes that any reduction in the rolls
reflects people who have gone to work. So states have a de facto incentive to
get people off the rolls in any way they can, not necessarily by getting them
into work activities. The states can
shift a big chunk of their own money out of the program if they want to. There is no matching
requirement for the states, only a maintenance-of-effort requirement that each
state keep spending at least 80 percent of what it was previously contributing.
This will allow as much as $40 billion nationally to be withheld from paying
benefits over the next six years, on top of the $55 billion cut by the bill
itself. Moreover, the 80 percent requirement is a static number, so the funding
base will immediately start being eroded by inflation.
Besides being able to transfer some
of their own money out, the states are allowed to transfer up to 30 percent of
their federal block grants to spending on childcare or other social services.
Among other things, this will encourage them to adopt time limits shorter than
five years, because this would save federal money that could then be devoted to
child care and other help that families need in order to be able to go to work.
Hobson's choice will flourish.
The contingency fund to cushion against
the impact of recessions or local economic crises is wholly inadequate -- $2
billion over five years. Welfare costs rose by $6 billion in three years during
the recession of the early nineties.
The federal AFDC law required the states to
make decisions on applications within forty-five days and to pay, retroactively
if necessary, from the thirtieth day after the application was put in. There is
no such requirement in the new law. All we know from the new law is that the state has to tell
the Secretary of Health and Human Services what its "objective
criteria" will be for "the delivery of benefits," and how it
will accord "fair and equitable
treatment" to recipients, including how it will give "adversely
affected" recipients an opportunity to be heard. This is weak, to say the
least……
EVEN given effective advocacy, relatively
responsive legislatures and welfare administrators, and serious efforts to find
private-sector jobs, the deck is stacked against success, especially in states
that have high concentrations of poverty and large welfare caseloads. The basic
issue is jobs. There simply are not enough jobs now. Four million adults are receiving Aid to Families with
Dependent Children. Half of them are long-term recipients. In city after city
around America the number of people who will have to find jobs will quickly
dwarf the number of new jobs created in recent years. Many cities have actually
lost jobs over the past five to ten years. New York City, for example, has lost 227,000 jobs since 1990, and the New
York metropolitan area
overall has lost 260,000 over the same period. New York City had more than
300,000 adults in the AFDC caseload in 1995, to say nothing of the adults
without dependent children who are receiving general assistance. Statistics aside,
all one has to do is go to Chicago, or to Youngstown, Ohio, or to Newark, or
peruse William Julius Wilson's powerful new book, When Work Disappears, to get
the point. The fact is that there are
not enough appropriate private-sector jobs in appropriate locations even now,
when unemployment is about as low as it ever gets in this country.
For some people, staying on welfare
was dictated by economics, because it involved a choice between the "poor
support" of welfare, to use the Harvard professor David Ellwood's term,
and the even worse situation of a low-wage job, with its take-home pay reduced
by the out-of-pocket costs of commuting and day care, and the potentially incalculable effects of losing health
coverage. With time limits these people will no longer have that choice,
unappetizing as it was, and will be forced to take a job that leaves them even
deeper in poverty. How many people will be able to get and keep a job, even a lousy job, is
impossible to say, but it is far from all of those who have been on welfare for
an extended period of time.
The labor market, even in its current
relatively heated state, is not friendly to people with little education and
few marketable skills, poor work habits, and various personal and family
problems that interfere with regular and punctual attendance.
People spend long spells on welfare
or are headed in that direction for reasons other than economic choice or, for
that matter, laziness. If we are going to put long-term welfare recipients to
work -- and we should make every effort to do so -- it will be difficult and it
will cost money to train people, to place them, and to provide continuing
support so that they can keep a job once they get it. If they are to have child
care and health coverage, that will
cost still more. Many of the jobs that people will get will not offer health
coverage, so transitional Medicaid for a year or two will not suffice. People
who have been on welfare for a long time will too often not make it in their
first job and will need continuing help toward and into a second job. Both
because the private sector may well not produce enough jobs right away and
because not all welfare
recipients will be ready for immediate placement in a private-sector
job, it will be appropriate also to use public jobs or jobs with nonprofit
organizations at least as a transition if not
as permanent positions. All of this costs real money.
For a lot of people it will not work
at all. Kansas City’s experience is sadly instructive here. In the past two
years, in a very well-designed and
well-implemented effort a local program
was able to put 1,409 out of 15,562 welfare
recipients to work. As of last December only 730 were still at work. The
efforts of Toby Herr and Project Match in
Chicago's Cabrini-Green public-housing project are another case in point. Working individually and
intensively with women and supporting them through successive jobs until they
found one they were able to keep, Herr had managed to place 54 percent of her
clients in year-round jobs at the end of five years. This is a remarkable (and
unusual) success rate, but it also
shows how unrealistic is a structure that offers only a 20 percent exception to
the five-year time limit.
I want to be very clear: I am not
questioning the willingness of long-term welfare recipients to work. Their
unemployment is significantly related to their capacity to work, whether for
personal or family reasons, far more than to their willingness to work. Many
long-term welfare recipients are functionally disabled even if they are not
disabled in a legal sense. News coverage of what the new law will mean has been
replete with heartbreaking stories of women who desperately want to work but
have severe trouble learning how to operate a cash register or can't remember
basic things they need to master. A study in the state of Washington shows that
36 percent of the caseload have learning disabilities that have never been
remediated. Many others have disabled
children or parents for whom they are the primary caretakers. Large numbers are
victims of domestic violence and risk physical retaliation if they enter the
workplace. These personal and family problems make such people poor candidates
for work in the best of circumstances.
Arbitrary time limits on their benefits will not make them likelier to gain and hold employment. When
unemployment goes back up to six or seven or eight percent nationally, as it
will at some point, the idea that the
private sector will employ and continue to employ those who are the hardest to
employ will be even more fanciful
than it is at the current, relatively propitious moment.
When the time limits take effect, the
realities occasioned by the meeting of a bottom-line-based labor market with so
many of our society's last hired and first fired will come into focus. Of course, a considerable number will not fall
off the cliff. An increased number will have obtained jobs along the way.
The time limits will help some people
to discipline themselves and ration
their years of available assistance. Some will move in with family or friends
when their benefits are exhausted. The 20 percent exception will help as well.
But there will be suffering. Some of
the damage will be obvious -- more homelessness, for example, with more demand
on already strapped shelters and soup kitchens. The ensuing problems will also
appear as increases in the incidence of other
problems, directly but perhaps not provably owing to the impact of the
welfare bill. There will be more malnutrition and more crime, increased infant
mortality, and increased drug and alcohol abuse. There will be increased family
violence and abuse against children and women, and a consequent significant spillover
of the problem into the already overloaded child-welfare system and
battered-women's shelters….